I recently bought Hard Core Logo on DVD, and I was really upset to find the DVD case tainted with Quentin Tarantino's name. To make things worse, the positioning of his imprint makes it appear that he directed the movie. Have a look for yourself:
All of which got me thinking about what I have against Tarantino anyway...
The problem with criminal-as-protagonist movies is that, somewhere along the line, they seem to have forgotten why the criminal was a compelling antihero. "Criminal" only denotes the violation of laws, which are sadly often far removed from correct behavior. The criminal, therefore, was not necessarily immoral. The smuggler, for example, might be heralded as a free market pioneer. The drug user might be a civil libertarian and a perfectly upstanding, moral individual. But there seems to have been a conflation between those who break the law yet are not immoral and those who are immoral for the sake of immorality. The transition happened in phases, and obviously these aren't in chronological order so much as general trends:
- Virtuous criminal as hero: think Spartacus. Nominally, he's a criminal, but in reality he's supposed to be understood as a tragic hero. (Disregard historicity, for simplicity's sake.)
- Self-interested but not necessarily immoral criminal as hero: Han Solo. Sure he's a smuggler, but he's just trying to make a living and those laws were probably arbitrary anyway, right?
- Reluctant, immoral criminal: Michael Corleone, the upstanding war hero who wants nothing to do with the family business gets pulled into being a mob boss anyway. At this point, you can still sympathize with the man, even though you know he will do evil deeds.
- And here we reach the worst of the lot: unapologetic criminals who are often shrouded in byzantine plots meant to further portray their moral ambiguity (Reservoir Dogs or Snatch). But there isn't really too much moral ambiguity in these scenarios after all, we are meant to sympathize with "bad guys" doing bad things.
Obviously, I don't have a fully fleshed-out thesis here. But I do find a lot of (needlessly) violent movies repulsive (sometimes sickeningly, stomach-turningly so) because I feel they're asking me to root for people doing things I find abhorrent.
Labels: film, media, philosophy
I know that the New York Times isn't particularly well-known as a publication of philosophical rigor, but this article in yesterday's issue just really irritated me with its pseudo-philosophical babble trying to tie together philosophical theories of mind, theological theories of soul, and evolutionary science in a neat little pop-science package:
The result is perhaps the strongest challenge yet to the worldview summed up by Descartes, the 17th-century philosopher who divided the creatures of the world between humanity and everything else. As biologists turn up evidence that animals can exhibit emotions and patterns of cognition once thought of as strictly human, Descartes's dictum, "I think, therefore I am," loses its force.
The big issue, of course, is that this completely misses Descartes' point.
Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am, is the same as: I think therefore I
exist. It simply means that if i were in a world where I couldn't believe a single thing that I perceived with any certainty (suppose I'm in
the Matrix), I could still have access to one bit of knowledge: by virtue of the fact that I can think
I must exist.
It's true enough that Descartes separated humans (as soul-owners) from other animals. But this particular quotation, apart from being sound bite–worthy, has nothing to do with Descartes' separation of humans from animals. Furthermore, the view that humans are unique has been universal in western thought since western thought has existed. I don't mean to sound pedantic, but the Times can surely do better than this fluff.
Labels: evolution, philosophy, religion, sham
Science cannot explain how the universe came to be, it can only endeavor to explain how the universe came to be the way it is from the way it was. Science can do something for us in this matter, however: it can tell us that the universe as we know it had a beginning. As far as physics goes, in fact, there is no coherent concept of "before" that beginning. Time itself began at the Big Bang. So using the faculty of mathematical reason, it can trace the course of history back to a time where there was a singularity (of course, that is not to say we have anywhere approaching a complete understanding of the universe back to that point). So, we are left with a single glaring instance for which science, whose mission it is to trace causation, cannot provide a cause: what caused the singularity? A subset of this question is: what caused the singularity to begin expanding (the Big Bang)?
Unfortunately, the only real conclusion this line of thought can reach is that there is either a supernatural uncaused cause (god[s]) that created the singularity or the singularity is itself a supernatural uncaused cause. So which is it? Are we all "gods" (or part of an omni-god: the uncaused existent we call "universe") or were we created by god(s)? Here, again, science might be able to suggest a solution. Our universe operates the way it does thanks to certain physical constants, which, if they were even modestly different than they are, could have resulted in a universe devoid of life as we know it. So if we assume that these constants had an equal probability of being any value, we can see that the odds would be infinitely against them being exactly what they are now. The "fine tuning" of these constants can been taken as a teleological explanation for the existence of a supernatural entity. That would make us, or something even better than us that can also exist as a result of the physical conditions of the universe, special. But, even though this may be true, it is an unsatisfying proof for the existence of a god.
In fact, if both a supernatural entity (or several, as we have not yet addressed the possibility of many gods) and the singularity exist outside of time, neither one can be assumed to require a cause in the temporal sense. So, if we are to list what we know, perhaps an explanation will manifest:
- While the universe was a singularity, there existed no time. [uncaused existent: universe]
- Time began when the singularity started to expand [uncaused existent: Big Bang] and from this point forward, scientific inquiry into normal causation became possible.
If there is no supernatural "first cause," then we neither have any real explanation for why the universe exists nor why the singularity began to expand 13.7 billion years ago. We would then need to posit two uncaused existents: the singularity itself and the Big Bang. If we posit the existence of a supernatural entity who caused both the singularity to exist and then caused it to expand, we need only posit one uncaused existent, namely that supernatural entity. But there is an important consideration that needs to be clarified, here:
If time did not begin until the Big Bang, then it does not make sense to call the supernatural entity the "cause" of a singularity existing outside of time since causation implies the existence of time. To this, I have two replies. First, we do not understand what it means to be outside of time: we simply cannot comprehend it. It may very well be the case that causation can make sense. This response is, however, clearly unsatisfying. My second response would be that perhaps it is the case that no singularity existed outside of time at all, but rather it was created at the moment it began to expand, i.e. the first moment of the expansion was not only the birth of time but also of the universe itself.
So what can we conclude about the existence of a supernatural entity? If we rely on the idea of simplicity, or Occam's Razor, we would decide that there are fewer hard-to-support assumptions in positing the existence of a single uncaused existent as opposed to two. But for two reasons, our conclusions would be unsatisfying again: (1) we have already accepted that the Big Bang and the existence of the singularity may have been coterminous, even though that term is hard to apply in a time-free context; so perhaps we are not really considering the position of two uncaused existents, but just one; (2) the principle of simplicity is merely a guide, it does not provide a proof.
Labels: cosmology, philosophy, physics, religion
(1) The bait:
Suppose you find a watch in a field.
(2) The hook:
Surely, it is too complex to have been created by natural processes.
(3a) The sinker?
Therefore, you assume it must have been created by a watchmaker (or, perhaps, by more than one watchmaker).
(3b) And just in case you missed "the sinker:"
How then, when we see the infinitely more complex processes of the universe, can we not come to the conclusion that the universe, too, must have been designed by an intelligent being (or perhaps by more than one)? So the universe must have been created by one or more designers.
(-1) Out of the frying pan, over the fire, and back into the lake:
Let's try this again. Suppose you find a watch in a field. It is too complex to have been created by natural processes. Therefore, you assume it must have been created by an intelligent designer. Right? Ok, sure. So you look closely, and sure enough the watch has an inscription, which reads: "I was made by Afshin. He is intelligent. He is a designer. And in case you were wondering, he is not God." So then you see Afshin. He's
much more complex than the watch. So you think, "Gee, Afshin sure is complex. He must have been designed by an intelligent designer or two." So even though you don't see Afshin's intelligent designer(s), you're pretty sure about the designer(s)' existence.
(0) Do you see the problem, yet?
So you've reasoned your way into believing that the complex watch was designed by more-complex Afshin. Then you've reasoned your way into believing that the more-complex Afshin was designed by an even-more-complex designer. Now, why isn't that even-more-complex designer (whose complexity
surely implies an intelligent designer - or a whole team of them) an indication of even-more-than-even-more-complex designer(s)? In other words: for all
x, with complexity
C(x),
x must have been designed by a designer,
y, with a complexity
C(y) greater than
C(x), which leads to an infinite regress.
Labels: evolution, intelligent design, logic, philosophy, religion
I just saw
this video of U2 and The Arcade Fire performing Joy Division's "Love Will Tear Us Apart." Be warned that the video is pretty shaky because it is hand-held, but the sound quality isn't as bad as I thought it would be. Bono sounds convincingly like Ian Curtis, which is a little surprising. As is typical when two full bands are on the same stage, there are a lot of extraneous members hanging around playing extraneous instruments (think of the gluttony of Temple of the Dog). This recording has the unmistakable feel of an impromptu "let's play a cover" decision and you can see the backup singers repeating the chorus an extra time and laughing about coming in at the wrong time. I'm not sure what I actually expected from the performance, but if for nothing but novelty value, I think this is one worth checking out. Oh yeah, and I like Régine Chassagne's boots. A lot of the comments about this are negative, but I don't really think it should be compared with the original so much as seen as an homage. (Although, when a band releases a cover on one of their records, I consider it open season to compare and criticize against the original version.)
Shooting the messenger (but missing): dishonest argumentation
I came across
an article, written by a
Professor David Schaefer (Political Science - Holy Cross), complaining about an anti-military recruiter organization called the "Coalition Against Militarism in Our Schools." Upon first glance, I can't imagine why anybody would find a group who proposes that perhaps 14-18 year-old high schoolers are not quite mature enough to decide whether they should join our armed forces objectionable. High school students have impartial guidance counselors, teachers and their parents to help them decide what they should do upon graduating, so if our point of reference is the best interest of the students, it doesn't seem as if they need the military recruiters to guide them. It seems much more likely that the military recruiters choose high schoolers precisely because many students are impressionable and easier to convince. Professor Schaefer must surely realize this, so he does not bother to attack the reason why a group might attack military recruiters in our school districts; instead, he attempts to divert the reader's attention with an
ad feminam attack against Arlene Inouye, a spokeswoman for the anti-recruiter group, that can only be taken as a cynical rhetorical device (from a man who teaches philosophy, no less). Not willing to address the elephant in the room (recruiting teenagers still in high school is basically an attempt to swindle students who don't know any better into enlisting to be shot at in Iraq), Professor Schaefer instead points out that Ms. Inouye recently published an article in an openly communist magazine:
During the [BBC/Public International Radio program "The World"] radio interview, Ms. Inouye identified herself simply as a speech therapist working in the Los Angeles public schools. There is another facet to her identity that she avoided mentioning, however, and it's easily discovered by using Google. Her article "Kick the Military Out of Your School! We Did in L.A. and So Can You!" was recently published in Dynamic Magazine, an organ of the Young Communist League. While the League's website does not disclose the nature of Ms. Inouye's role in the organization, "the militarization of our schools" and "the impact of military recruitment on high school students" are the major themes of the YCL's current "Realities of War Speaking Tour." The "Coalition Against Militarism in Our Schools" thus sounds suspiciously like what used to be called a Communist front group.
He tries to impugn Ms. Inouye by insinuating the she has lied about her background (because in Professor Schaefer's world, apparently, every spokesperson first identifies her political allegiances before addressing any issue). Realizing that he cannot actually prove that Ms. Inouye is a communist (and apparently not realizing that the specter of the red bogeyman isn't as terrifying today as it once was) he points to phrases in her argument that are similar to the Young Communist League's current platform as evidence that she must be a communist. I have not read any of Professor Schaefer's academic writing and I cannot comment on it, but I can only imagine that it is not as shoddily argued as this small piece. The only conclusion I can draw from this is that he is making an intellectually dishonest argument first by attacking the messenger rather than the message and second by not even making that attack an effective one.
Labels: academia, education, military, music, philosophy
It often takes a philosopher to tell it like it is. And
this is what it's like.
Labels: 'merica, education, evolution, philosophy, sham
